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Abstract. Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent
cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses
that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed
if one can prove that the program does not leak more information than
the public outputs of the computation.
We propose a novel approach for verifying constant-time programming
based on a new information flow property, called output-sensitive non-
interference. Noninterference states that a public observer cannot learn
anything about the private data. Since real systems need to intentionally
declassify some information, this property is too strong in practice. In
order to take into account public outputs we proceed as follows: instead
of using complex explicit declassification policies, we partition variables
in three sets: input, output and leakage variables. Then, we propose a
typing system to statically check that leakage variables do not leak more
information about the secret inputs than the public normal output. The
novelty of our approach is that we track the dependence of leakage vari-
ables with respect not only to the initial values of input variables (as
in classical approaches for noninterference), but taking also into account
the final values of output variables. We adapted this approach to LLVM
IR and we developed a prototype to verify LLVM implementations.
Keywords: Information flow · Output-sensitive non-interference · Type
system.
1 Introduction
An important task of cryptographic research is to verify cryptographic imple-
mentations for security flaws, in particular to avoid so-called timing attacks.
Such attacks consist in measuring the execution time of an implementation on
its execution platform. For instance, Brumley and Boneh [12] showed that it was
possible to mount remote timing attacks by against OpenSSL’s implementation
of the RSA decryption operation and to recover the key. Albrecht and Paterson
[3] showed that the two levels of protection offered against the Lucky 13 attack
from [2] in the first release of the new implementation of TLS were imperfect. A
⋆ This work is supported by the French National Research Agency in the framework
of the “Investissements d’ avenir” program (ANR-15-IDEX-02)
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related class of attacks are cache-based attacks in which a malicious party is able
to obtain memory-access addresses of the target program which may depend on
secret data through observing cache accesses. Such attacks allow to recover the
complete AES keys [17].
A possible countermeasure is to follow a very strict programming discipline
called constant-time programming. Its principle is to avoid branchings con-
trolled by secret data and memory load/store operations indexed by secret data.
Recent secure C libraries such as NaCl [10] or mbedTLS1 follow this program-
ming discipline. Until recently, there was no rigorous proof that constant-time
algorithms are protected to cache-based attacks. Moreover, many cryptographic
implementations such as PolarSSL AES, DES, and RC4 make array accesses
that depend on secret keys and are not constant time. Recent works [6,4,11] fill
this gap and develop the first formal analyzes that allow to verify if programs
are correct with respect to the constant-time paradigm.
An interesting extension was brought by Almeida et al. [4] who enriched
the constant-time paradigm “distinguishing not only between public and private
input values, but also between private and publicly observable output values”.
This distinction raises interesting technical and theoretical challenges. Indeed,
constant-time implementations in cryptographic libraries like OpenSSL include
optimizations for which paths and addresses can depend not only on public input
values, but also on publicly observable output values. Hence, considering only
input values as non-secret information would thus incorrectly characterize those
implementations as non-constant-time. [4] also develops a verification technique
based on symbolic execution. However, the soundness of their approach depends
in practice on the soundness of the underlying symbolic execution engine, which
is very difficult to guarantee for real-world programs with loops. Moreover, their
product construction can be very expensive in the worst case.
In this paper we deal with statically checking programs for output-sensitive
constant-time correctness: programs can still do branchings or memory ac-
cesses controlled by secret data if the information that is leaked is subsumed by
the normal output of the program. To give more intuition about the property
that we want to deal with, let us consider the following example, where ct eq is
a constant time function that allows to compare the arguments:
good = 1;
for (i=0; i<B_Size; i++){good = good & ct_eq(secret[i],in_p[i]);}
if (!good) { for(i=0; i<B_Size; i++) secret[i] = 0; }
return good;
Let suppose that the array variable secret is secret, and all the other vari-
ables are public. Intuitively this a sort of one-time check password verifying that
in p = secret and otherwise overwrites the array secret with zero. Obviously,
this function is not constant-time as the variable good depends on secret, and
hence branching on good violates the principles of constant-time programming.
It is easy to transform this program into an equivalent one which is constant
time. For example one could replace
if (!good) { for(i=0; i<B_Size; i++) secret[i] = 0; }
1 mbed TLS (formerly known as PolarSSL). https://tls.mbed.org/
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by
for (i=0; i<B_Size; i++) {secret[i] = secret[i] & ct_eq(good,1);}
But branching on good is a benign optimization, since anyway, the value of good
is the normal output of the program. Hence, even if the function is not constant-
time, it should be considered output-sensitive constant time with respect
to its specification. Such optimization opportunities arise whenever the interface
of the target application specifies what are the publicly observable outputs, and
this information is sufficient to classify the extra leakage as benign [4].
The objective of this work is to propose a static method to check if a program
is output-sensitive constant time secure. We emphasize that our goal is not to
verify that the legal output leaks “too much”, but rather to ensure that the
unintended (side-channel) output does not leak more than this legal output.
First, we propose a novel approach for verifying constant-time security based
on a new information flow property, called output-sensitive noninterference.
Information-flow security prevents confidential information to be leaked to pub-
lic channels. Noninterference states that a public observer cannot learn anything
about the private data. Since real systems need to intentionally declassify some
information, this property is too strong. An alternative is relaxed noninterfer-
ence which allows to specify explicit downgrading policies. In order to take into
account public outputs while staying independent of how programs intention-
ally declassify information, we develop an alternative solution: instead of using
complex explicit policies for functions, we partition variables in three sets: in-
put, output and leakage variables. Hence we distinguish between the legal public
output and the information that can leak through side-channels, expressed by
adding fresh additional leakage variables. Then we propose a typing system that
can statically check that leakage variables do not leak more secret information
than the public normal output. The novelty of our approach is that we track the
dependence of leakage variables with respect to both the initial value of input
variables (as classically the case for noninterference) and final values of output
variables. Then, we show how to verify that a program written in a high-level
language is output-sensitive constant time secure by using this typing system.
Since timed and cache-based attacks target the executions of programs, it
is important to carry out this verification in a language close to the machine-
executed assembly code. Hence, we adapt our approach to a generic unstructured
assembly language inspired from LLVM and we show how we can verify programs
coded in LLVM. Finally, we developed a prototype tool implementing our type
system and we show how it can be used to verify LLVM implementations.
To summarize, this work makes the following contributions described above:
- in section 2 we reformulate output-sensitive constant-time as a new interesting
noninterference property and we provide a sound type system that guarantees
that well-typed programs are output-sensitive noninterferent;
- in section 3 we show that this general approach can be used to verify that
programs written in a high-level language are output-sensitive constant time;
- in section 4 we adapt our approach to the LLVM-IR language and we develop
a prototype tool that can be used to verify LLVM implementations.
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(x := e, σ) −→ σ[x 7→ σ(e)] (skip, σ) −→ σ
(c1, σ) −→ σ
′
(c1; c2, σ) −→ (c2, σ
′)
(c1, σ) −→ (c
′
1, σ
′)
(c1; c2, σ) −→ (c
′
1; c2, σ
′)
σ(e) = 1 ? i = 1 : i = 2
(If e then c1 else c2 fi , σ) −→ (ci, σ)
σ(e) 6= 1
(While e Do c oD , σ) −→ σ
σ(e) = 1
(While e Do c oD , σ) −→ (c;While e Do c oD , σ)
Fig. 1. Operational semantics of the While language
2 Output-sensitive non-interference
2.1 The While language and Output-sensitive noninterference
In order to reason about the security of the code, we first develop our framework
in While, a simple high-level structured programming language. In section 3
we shall enrich this simple language with arrays and in section 4 we adapt our
approach to a generic unstructured assembly language. The syntax of While
programs is listed below:
c ::= x := e | skip | c1; c2 | If e then c1 else c2 fi | While e Do c oD
Meta-variables x, e and c range over the sets of program variables V ar, expres-
sions and programs, respectively. We leave the syntax of expressions unspecified,
but we assume they are deterministic and side-effect free. The semantics is shown
in Figure 1. The reflexive and transitive closure of −→ is denoted by =⇒. A state
σ maps variables to values, and we write σ(e) to denote the value of expression
e in state σ. A configuration (c, σ) is a program c to be executed along with the
current state σ. Intuitively, if we want to model the security of some program c
with respect to side-channel attacks, we can assume that there are three special
subsets of variables: XI the public input variables, XO the public output vari-
ables and XL the variables that leak information to some malicious adversary.
Then, output sensitive nonintereference asks that every two complete executions
starting with XI -equivalent states and ending with XO-equivalent final states
must be indistinguishable with respect to the leakage variables XL .
Definition 1. (adapted from [4]) Let XI , XO, XL ⊆ V ar be three sets of vari-
ables, intended to represent the input, the output and the leakage of a program.
A program c is (XI , XO, XL)-secure when all its executions starting with XI-
equivalent stores and leading to XO-equivalent final stores, give XL-equivalent
final stores. Formally, for all σ, σ′, ρ, ρ′, if 〈c, σ〉 =⇒ σ′ and 〈c, ρ〉 =⇒ ρ′ and
σ =XI ρ and σ
′ =XO ρ
′, then σ′ =XL ρ
′.
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2.2 Typing rules
This section introduces a type-based information flow analysis that allows to
check whether a While program is output-sensitive noninterferent, i.e. the pro-
gram does not leak more information about the secret inputs than the public
normal output.
As usual, we consider a flow lattice of security levels L. An element x of L
is an atom if x 6= ⊥ and there exists no element y ∈ L such that ⊥ ⊏ y ⊏ x. A
lattice is called atomistic if every element is the join of atoms below it.
Assumption 2.21 Let (L,⊓,⊔,⊥,⊤) be an atomistic continuous bounded lat-
tice. As usual, we denote t1 ⊑ t2 iff t2 = t1 ⊔ t2. We assume that there exists
a distinguished subset TO ⊆ L of atoms. Hence, from the above assumption, for
any τo, τ
′
o ∈ TO and for any t1, t2 ∈ L: it holds that
A1. τo ⊑ τ ′o implies τo = τ
′
o,
A2. τo ⊑ t1 ⊔ t2 implies τo ⊑ t1 or τo ⊑ t2,
A3. τo ⊑ t1 implies that there exists t ∈ L such that t1 = t ⊔ τo and τ0 6⊑ t.
A type environment Γ : V ar 7→ L describes the security levels of variables
and the dependency with respect to the current values of variables in XO. In
order to catch dependencies with respect to current values of output variables,
we associate to each output variable o ∈ XO a fixed and unique symbolic type
α(o) ∈ TO. For example if some variable x ∈ V ar has the type Γ (x) = Low⊔α(o),
it means that the value of x depends only on public input and the current value
of the output variable o ∈ XO.
Hence, we assume that there is a fixed injective mapping α : X0 7→ T0
such that
∧
o1,o2∈XO
(
o1 6= o2 ⇒ α(o1) 6= α(o2)
)
∧
∧
o∈XO
(
α(o) ∈ TO
)
. We extend
mappings Γ and α to sets of variables in the usual way: given A ⊆ V ar and
B ⊆ XO we note Γ (A)
def
=
⊔
x∈A
Γ (x) , α(B)
def
=
⊔
x∈B
α(x).
Our type system aims to satisfy the following output sensitive non-interference
condition: if the final values of output variables in XO remain the same, only
changes to initial inputs with types ⊑ t should be visible to leakage outputs with
type ⊑ t ⊔ α(XO). More precisely, given a derivation ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′, the final value
of a variable x with final type Γ ′(x) = t ⊔ α(A) for some t ∈ L and A ⊆ XO,
should depend at most on the initial values of those variables y with initial types
Γ (y) ⊑ t and on the final values of variables in A. We call “real dependencies”
the dependencies with respect to initial values of variables and “symbolic depen-
dencies” the dependencies with respect to the current values of output variables.
Following [19] we formalize the non-interference condition satisfied by the typing
system using reflexive and symmetric relations.
We write =A0 for relation which relates mappings which are equal on all
values in A0 i.e. for two mappings f1, f2 : A 7→ B and A0 ⊆ A, f1 =A0 f2 iff
∀a ∈ A0, f1(a) = f2(a). For any mappings f1 : A1 7→ B and f2 : A2 7→ B, we
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write f1[f2] the operation which updates f1 according to f2, namely
f1[f2](x)
def
=
{
f2(x) if x ∈ A1 ∩A2
f1(x) if x ∈ A1 \A2
Given Γ : V ar 7→ L , X ⊆ V ar and t ∈ L, we write =Γ,X,t for the reflexive and
symmetric relation which relates states that are equal on all variables having
type v ⊑ t in environment Γ , provided that they are equal on all variables in X :
σ =Γ,X,t σ
′ iff σ =X σ
′ ⇒
(
∀x, (Γ (x) ⊑ t ⇒ σ(x) = σ′(x))
)
. When X = ∅, we
omit it, hence we write =Γ,t instead of =Γ,∅,t.
Definition 2. [20] Let R and S be reflexive and symmetric relations on states.
We say that program c maps R into S, written c : R =⇒ S, iff ∀σ, ρ, if 〈c, σ〉 =⇒
σ′ and 〈c, ρ〉 =⇒ ρ′ then σRρ⇒ σ′Sρ′.
The type system we propose enjoys the following useful property:
if ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ then c : =Γ,Γ (XI ) =⇒ =Γ ′,XO,α(XO)⊔Γ (XI)
This property is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Hence, in order to prove that the above program c is output sensitive non-
interferent according to Definition 1, it is enough to check that for all xl ∈ XL,
Γ ′(xl) ⊑ α(XO)⊔ Γ (XI). Two executions of the program c starting from initial
states that coincide on input variablesXI , and ending in final states that coincide
on output variables XO, will coincide also on the leaking variables XL.
We now formally introduce our typing system. Due to assignments, values and
types of variables change dynamically. For example let us assume that at some
point during the execution, the value of x depends on the initial value of some
variable y and the current value of some output variable o (which itself depends
on the initial value of some variable h), formally captured by an environment Γ
where Γ (o) = Γ0(h) and Γ (x) = Γ0(y) ⊔ α(o), where Γ0 represents the initial
environment. If the next to be executed instruction is some assignment to o, then
the current value of o will change, so we have to mirror this in the new type of x:
even if the value of x does not change, its new type will be Γ ′(x) = Γ0(y)⊔Γ0(h)
(assuming that α(o) 6⊑ Γ0(y)). Hence Γ ′(x) is obtained by replacing in Γ (x) the
symbolic dependency α(o) with the real dependency Γ (o).
Definition 3. If t0 ∈ TO is an atom and t′, t ∈ L are arbitrary types, then we
denote by t[t′/t0] the type obtained by replacing (if any) the occurrence of t0 by
t′ in the decomposition At(t) in atoms of t
t[t′/t0]
def
=
{
t if t0 6∈ At(t)
t′ ⊔ ⊔b∈At(t)\{t0}b if t
0 ∈ At(t)
Now we extend this definition to environments: let x ∈ XO and p ∈ L. Then
Γ1
def
= Γ ⊳α x represents the environment where the symbolic dependency on
the last value of x of all variables is replaced by the real type of x: Γ1(y)
def
=
(Γ (y))[Γ (x)/α(x)]. Similarly, (p, Γ )⊳α x
def
= p[Γ (x)/α(x)].
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The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the Assumption 2.21
and Definition 3.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ XO, p ∈ L and let us denote Γ1
def
= Γ ⊳α x and p1
def
=
(p, Γ )⊳α x. If α(x) 6⊑ Γ (x), then,
1. For any v ∈ X, Γ1(v) = (Γ (v), Γ )⊳α x,
2. For all variables y ∈ V ar, α(x) 6⊑ Γ1(y).
3. α(x) 6⊑ p1.
We want now to extend the above definition from a single output variable x to
subsetsX ⊆ XO. Our typing system will ensure that each generated environment
Γ will not contain circular symbolic dependencies between output variables,
i.e., there are no output variable o1, o2 ∈ XO such that α(o1) ⊑ Γ (o2) and
α(o2) ⊑ Γ (o1). We can associate a graph G(Γ ) = (XO, E) to an environment
Γ , such that (o1, o2) ∈ E iff α(o1) ⊑ Γ (o2). We say that Γ is well formed,
denoted AC(Γ ), if G(Γ ) is an acyclic graph. For acyclic graphs G(Γ ), we define a
preorder overXO, denoted ⊑Γ , as the transitive closure of the relation {(o1, o2) ∈
XO × XO | α(o1) ⊑ Γ (o2)}, i.e. o1 ⊑Γ o2 iff there is a path from o1 to o2
in G(Γ ). We also define the reachable variables of x ∈ XO w.r.t. Γ , denoted
GT Γ (x), to be the set of all o ∈ XO such that x ⊑Γ o. Now, for acyclic graphs
G(Γ ), we can extend Definition 3 to subsets X ⊆ XO, by first fixing an ordering
X = {x1, x2, . . . xn} of variables in XO compatible with the graph (i.e. j ≤ k
implies that xj 6⊑Γ xk), and then (p, Γ )⊳αX
def
= (((p, Γ )⊳αx1)⊳αx2) . . .⊳αxn.
We also denote Γ ⊳αX
def
= ((Γ ⊳α x1)⊳α x2) . . .⊳α xn (in this case the ordering
is not important, i.e. (Γ ⊳α x1)⊳α x2 = (Γ ⊳α x2)⊳α x1).
The following lemma can be proved by induction on the size of X using
Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let X ⊆ XO, p ∈ L and let us denote Γ2
def
= Γ ⊳α X and p2
def
=
(p, Γ )⊳α X. If AC(Γ ), then,
1. For any v ∈ X, Γ2(v) = (Γ (v), Γ )⊳α X,
2. For all variables x ∈ X, and all variables y ∈ V ar, α(x) 6⊑ Γ2(y).
3. For all variables x ∈ X, α(x) 6⊑ p2.
Next Lemma gives a precise characterization of the new preorder induced by
the application of the operator ⊳α.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a well formed environment and let x ∈ XO and X ⊆ XO.
Let us denote Γ1
def
= Γ ⊳αx and Γ2
def
= Γ⊳αX. Then Γ1 and Γ2 are well formed.
Moreover, ⊑Γ1=⊑Γ \{(x, o) | o ∈ XO} and ⊑Γ2=⊑Γ \{(x, o) | x ∈ X, o ∈ XO}.
Proof: The key remark is that any edge of G(Γ1) where Γ1
def
= Γ ⊳α x
corresponds to either an edge or to a path of length two in G(Γ ). Indeed, let
x1, x2 ∈ XO such that there exists an edge from x1 to x2 in G(Γ1), that is α(x1) ⊑
Γ1(x2) = Γ (x2)[Γ (x)/α(x)]. Then either α(x1) ⊑ Γ (x2) or α(x) ⊑ Γ (x2) and
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x 6∈ XO
As1
p ⊢α Γ{x := e}Γ [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ [α](fv(e))]
x ∈ XO \ fv(e) Γ1 = Γ ⊳α x
As2
p ⊢α Γ{x := e}Γ1 [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e))]
Skip
p ⊢α Γ{skip}Γ
x ∈ XO ∩ fv(e) Γ1 = Γ ⊳α x
As3
p ⊢α Γ{x := e}Γ1 [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ (x) ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e) \ x)]
p ⊢α Γ{c1}Γ1 p ⊢α Γ1{c2}Γ2
Seq
p ⊢α Γ{c1; c2}Γ2
p0 ⊑r p1 Γ ⊑r Γ
′ p1 ⊢α Γ
′{c}Γ ′1 Γ
′
1 ⊑r Γ1
Sub
p0 ⊢α Γ{c}Γ1
p ⊔ p′ ⊢α Γ{ci}Γi
p′ = (Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ )⊳α (aff
O(c1) ∪ aff
O(c2))
Γ ′ = Γ1 ⊳α aff
O(c2) ⊔ Γ2 ⊳α aff
O(c1)
If
p ⊢α Γ{If e then c1 else c2 fi }Γ
′
p ⊔ pe ⊢α Γ1{c}Γ
′
pe = Γ1[α](fv(e))
(Γ ⊳α aff
O(c)) ⊔ (Γ ′ ⊳α aff
O(c)) ⊑r Γ1
Wh
p ⊢α Γ{While e Do c oD }Γ1
Fig. 2. Flow-sensitive typing rules for commands with output
α(x1) ⊑ Γ (x). Hence either there is an edge from x1 to x2 in G(Γ ) or there must
exist edges from x1 to x and from x to x2 (and hence a path of length two from
x1 to x2) in G(Γ ). Now the assertion of the Lemma is an immediate consequence
of the above remark and Lemma 1.
Let aff(c) be the set of assigned variables in a program c, formally defined
by:
aff(c)
def
=


{x} if c ≡ x := e
∅ if c ≡ skip
aff(c1) ∪ aff(c2) if c ≡ c1; c2
aff(c1) ∪ aff(c2) if c ≡ If e then c1 else c2 fi
aff(c) if c ≡ While e Do c oD
and let us denote aff I(c)
def
= aff(c) ∩ (V ar \XO) and affO(c)
def
= aff(c) ∩XO.
We define the ordering over environments as usual:
Γ1 ⊑ Γ2
def
=
∧
x∈V ar
Γ1(x) ⊑ Γ2(x).
We also define a restricted ordering over environments:
Γ1 ⊑r Γ2
def
=
∧
x∈V ar
Γ1(x) ⊑ Γ2(x) ∧
∧
o∈XO,x∈V ar
(α(o) ⊑ Γ2(x)⇒ α(o) ⊑ Γ1(x)).
Is is immediate that Γ1 ⊑r Γ2 implies Γ1 ⊑ Γ2. Intuitively, when enriching
an environment using ⊑r, we have the right to add only “real dependencies”
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(and not “symbolic” dependencies with respect to variables in XO). We adapt
this definition for elements t1, t2 ∈ L as well: we denote t1 ⊑r t2 when t1 ⊑ t2,
and for all o ∈ XO, α(o) ⊑ t2 ⇒ α(o) ⊑ t1, i.e. t2 does not contain new symbolic
dependencies w.r.t. t1.
Next lemma is immediate from the definitions.
Lemma 4. Let Γ1, Γ2, Γ3 such that Γ1 ⊑ Γ2, p1, p2 ∈ L, o ∈ XO and X ⊆ XO
with p1 ⊑r p2. Then Γ1 ⊳α o ⊑ Γ2 ⊳α o, Γ1 ⊳α X ⊑ Γ2 ⊳α X, (p1, Γ1) ⊳α o ⊑
(p2, Γ2) ⊳α o and (p1, Γ1) ⊳α X ⊑ (p2, Γ2) ⊳α X. Moreover, Γ1 ⊳α X ⊑r Γ3
implies that Γ3 ⊳α X = Γ3.
The last assertion of the lemma is a consequence of the remark that Γ1⊳αX ⊑r
Γ3 implies that Γ3 does not contain more “symbolic dependencies” than Γ1⊳αX ,
and Γ1 ⊳α X does not contain any “symbolic dependencies” with respect to
variables in X . Obviously, using that ⊑r⊆⊑, all inequalities hold also when the
premise Γ1 ⊑ Γ2 is replaced by Γ1 ⊑r Γ2.
For a command c, judgements have the form p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ
′ where p ∈ L and
Γ and Γ ′ are type environments well-formed. The inference rules are shown in
Figure 2. The idea is that if Γ describes the security levels of variables which hold
before execution of c, then Γ ′ will describe the security levels of those variables
after execution of c. The type p represents the usual program counter level and
serves to eliminate indirect information flows; the derivation rules ensure that
all variables that can be changed by c will end up (in Γ ′) with types greater than
or equal to p. As usual, whenever p = ⊥ we drop it and write ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ instead
of ⊥ ⊢α Γ{c}Γ
′. Throughout this paper the type of an expression e is defined
simply by taking the lub of the types of its free variables Γ [α](fv(e)), for example
the type of x+ y + o where o is the only output variable is Γ (x) ⊔ Γ (y) ⊔ α(o).
This is consistent with the typing rules used in many systems, though more
sophisticated typing rules for expressions would be possible in principle. Notice
that considering the type of an expression to be Γ [α](fv(e)) instead of Γ (fv(e))
allows to capture the dependencies with respect to the current values of output
variables. In order to give some intuition about the rules, we present a simple
example in Figure 3.
Example 1. Let {x, y, z, u} ⊆ V ar\XO and {o1, o2, o3} ⊆ XO be some variables,
and let us assume that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, α(oi) = Oi. We assume that the initial
environment is Γ0 = [x → X, y → Y, z → Z, u → U, o1 → O1, o2 → O2, o3 →
O3]. Since the types of variables x, u and o3 do not change, we omit them in the
following. We highlighted the changes with respect to the previous environment.
After the first assignment, the type of o1 becomes X , meaning that the current
value of o1 depends on the initial value of x. After the assignment y := o1 + z,
the type of y becomes O1 ⊔ Z, meaning that the current value of y depends on
the initial value of z and the current value of o1. After the assignment o1 = u,
the type of y becomes X ⊔ Z as o1 changed and we have to mirror this in the
dependencies of y, and the type of o1 becomes X . When we enter in the If , the
program counter level changes to p = O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X as the expression o2 = o3 +x
depends on the values of variables o2, o3, x, but o2 and o3 are output variables
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p = ⊥, Γ0 = [y → Y, z → Z, o1 → O1, o2 → O2]
(1) o1 := x+ 1
Γ1 = [y → Y, z → Z, o1 → X, o2 → O2]
(2) y := o1 + z
Γ2 = [y → O1 ⊔ Z, z → Z, o1 → X, o2 → O2]
(3) o1 := u
Γ3 = [y→ X ⊔ Z, z → Z,o1 → U, o2 → O2]
(4) z := o1 + o3
Γ4 = [y → X ⊔ Z, z→ O1 ⊔O3, o1 → U, o2 → O2]
(5) If (o2 = o3 + x) p = O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X
(6) then o1 := o2
Γ6 = [y → X ⊔ Z, z→ U ⊔O3,o1 → O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X ⊔O2, o2 → O2]
(7) else o2 := o1
Γ7 = [y → X ⊔ Z, z → O1 ⊔ O3, o1 → U, o2 → O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X ⊔O1]
(8) fi
Γ8 = (Γ6 ⊳α o2) ⊔ (Γ7 ⊳α o1) = [y → X ⊔ Z, z→ U ⊔O3,
o1 → O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X ⊔U, o2 → O3 ⊔O2 ⊔X ⊔U]
Fig. 3. Example of application for our typing system
and o2 will be assigned by the If command, hence we replace the “symbolic”
dependency α(o2) = O2 by its “real” dependency Γ (o2) = O2. At the end of
the If command, we do the join of the two environments obtained after the
both branches, but in order to prevent cycles, we first replace the “symbolic”
dependencies by the corresponding “real” dependencies for each output variable
that is assigned by the other branch.
2.3 Well-formed environments
In this section we prove that, if the initial environment is well-formed, then all
the environments generated by the typing system are well-formed too. To do
so, the following lemma states some useful properties, where for any p ∈ L, we
denote by atomO(p)
def
= {o ∈ XO | α(o) ⊑ p}.
Lemma 5. For all Γ , if AC(Γ ) and p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ and atomO(p)∩affO(c) = ∅
then
1. AC(Γ ′),
2. for any o ∈ XO \ (aff
O(c) ∪ atomO(p)), GT Γ ′(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o),
3. for any o ∈ atomO(p), GT Γ ′(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o) ∪ aff
O(c),
4. for any o ∈ affO(c), GT Γ ′(o) ⊆ aff
O(c),
5. for any x 6∈ aff(c), (Γ ⊳α aff
O(c))(x) ⊑r Γ
′(x).
Proof: Proof is by induction on the derivation of p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ for all assertions
in the same time. We do a case analysis according to the last rule applied (case
Skip is trivial).
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(Ass1) c is an assignment x := e for some x 6∈ XO.
Since x 6∈ XO, it follows that G(Γ ′) = G(Γ ) and obviously for any x 6∈ aff(c),
Γ (x) = Γ ′(x) and ⊑Γ=⊑Γ ′ and AC(Γ ) implies AC(Γ
′).
(Ass2) c is an assignment o := e for some o ∈ XO \ fv(e). Hence in this case
aff(c) = affO(c) = {o}, and by assumption, α(o) 6⊑ p.
Then Γ ′ = Γ1[o 7→ p⊔Γ1[α](fv(e))] with Γ1 = Γ⊳αo. By Lemma 3, AC(Γ1),
and using Lemma 1 we get thatAC(Γ1) does not contain any edge with origin
o and hence AC(Γ ′). The second part follows from the remark that using
Lemma 3 we get ⊑Γ1=⊑Γ \{(o, o
′) | o′ ∈ XO} and ⊑Γ ′=⊑Γ1 ∪{(o
′, o) |
o′ ∈ atomO(p)} , and for any o′ 6= o, Γ1(o′) = Γ (o′). Hence, GT Γ ′(o) = ∅.
Finally, for any x 6∈ aff(c), (Γ ⊳α o)(x) = Γ1(x) = Γ ′(x).
(Ass3) c is an assignment o := e for some o ∈ XO ∩ fv(e). Similar to the previous
case.
(Seq) c is c1; c2. Then p ⊢α Γ{c1; c2}Γ2 was inferred based on p ⊢α Γ{c1}Γ1 and
p ⊢α Γ1{c2}Γ2. Let us denote Ui = affO(ci), for i = 1, 2.
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊢α Γ{c1}Γ1 we get thatAC(Γ1), and for
any o ∈ XO \ (U1 ∪atomO(p)), GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o), for any o ∈ atomO(p),
GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o) ∪ U1 and for any o ∈ U1, GT Γ1(o) ⊆ U1. In addition, for
any x 6∈ U1, (Γ ⊳α U1))(x) ⊑r Γ1(x).
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊢α Γ1{c2}Γ2 we get that AC(Γ2),
and for any o ∈ XO \ (U2 ∪ atomO(p)), GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o), for any
o ∈ atomO(p), GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o)∪U2 and for any o ∈ U2, GT Γ2(o) ⊆ U2.
In addition, for any x 6∈ U2, (Γ1 ⊳α U2)(x) ⊑r Γ2(x).
Since affO(c) = U1 ∪ U2, for any o ∈ XO \ (U1 ∪ U2 ∪ atomO(p)), we have
both o ∈ XO \ (U1 ∪ atomO(p)) and o ∈ XO \ (U2 ∪ atomO(p)) and hence
GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o).
For any o ∈ atomO(p), GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o) ∪ U2 ⊆ GT Γ (o) ∪ U1 ∪ U2.
Now, for any o ∈ (U1 ∪ U2), either o ∈ U2 or o ∈ U1 \ U2. If o ∈ U2, then
GT Γ2(o) ⊆ U2 ⊆ U1 ∪ U2. If o ∈ U1 \ U2, then GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o) ⊆ U1 ⊆
U1 ∪ U2.
Finally, for any x 6∈ aff (c), we have (Γ ⊳α (U1 ∪ U2)(x) = ((Γ ⊳α U1) ⊳α
U2)(x) = ((Γ ⊳α U1)(x), Γ ⊳α U1) ⊳α U2
(1)
⊑ r ((Γ ⊳α U1)(x), Γ1) ⊳α U2
(2)
⊑ r
(Γ1(x), Γ1)⊳α U2 = (Γ1 ⊳α U2)(x)
(3)
⊑ r Γ2(x). We used whenever necessarily
Lemma 5; in addition, in (1) we used that (Γ ⊳α U1)(x) does not depend on
variables in U1, and by induction hypothesis for all variables v 6∈ U1, (Γ ⊳α
U1)(v) ⊑r Γ1(v), in (2) we used that by induction hypothesis (Γ⊳αU1)(x) ⊑r
Γ1(x), in (3) we used that x 6∈ U2, and hence by induction hypothesis,
(Γ1 ⊳α U2)(x) ⊑r Γ2(x).
(If) c is If e then c1 else c2 fi . Then p ⊢α Γ{If e then c1 else c2 fi }Γ
′ was in-
ferred based on p⊔p′ ⊢α Γ{ci}Γi, where p′ = (Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ )⊳α (affO(c1)∪
affO(c2)) and Γ
′ = Γ ′1 ⊔ Γ
′
2 where Γ
′
1 = Γ1 ⊳α aff
O(c2) and Γ
′
2 = Γ2 ⊳α
affO(c1). Let us denote Ui = aff
O(ci), for i = 1, 2. First notice that atomO(p)∩
(U1 ∪ U2) = ∅ ensures that atomO(p ⊔ p′) ∩ (U1 ∪ U2) = ∅ .
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊔ p′ ⊢α Γ{c1}Γ1 we get that AC(Γ1),
and for any o ∈ XO \ (U1 ∪ atomO(p⊔ p′)), GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o), for any o ∈
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atomO(p⊔ p′), GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o)∪U1 and for any o ∈ U1, GT Γ1(o) ⊆ U1.
In addition, for any x 6∈ U1, (Γ ⊳α U1))(x) ⊑r Γ1(x).
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊔ p′ ⊢α Γ{c2}Γ2 we get that AC(Γ2),
and for any o ∈ XO \ (U2 ∪ atomO(p ⊔ p
′), GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o), for any o ∈
atomO(p⊔ p′), GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o)∪U2 and for any o ∈ U2, GT Γ2(o) ⊆ U2.
In addition, for any x 6∈ U2, (Γ ⊳α U2))(x) ⊑r Γ2(x).
For any o ∈ XO\(U1∪U2∪atomO(p⊔p′)), GT Γ ′1∪Γ ′2(o) = GT (Γ1⊳αU2)∪(Γ2⊳αU1)(o) ⊆
GT Γ (o) since both GT Γ1⊳αU2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o) and GT Γ2⊳αU1(o) ⊆
GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o).
For any o ∈ U1, GT Γ2⊳αU1(o) = ∅ and by induction hypothesis GT Γ1⊳αU2(o) ⊆
GT Γ1(o) ⊆ U1. For any o ∈ U2, GT Γ1⊳αU2(o) = ∅ and by induction hypoth-
esis GT Γ2⊳αU1(o) ⊆ GT Γ2(o) ⊆ U2. This implies that for any o ∈ (U1 ∪ U2),
GT Γ ′1∪Γ ′2(o) = GT (Γ1⊳αU1)∪(Γ2⊳αU2)(o) ⊆ U1 ∪ U2.
For any o ∈ atomO(p⊔p′), by induction hypothesis GT Γ1⊳αU2(o) ⊆ GT Γ1(o) ⊆
GT Γ (o)∪U1 and GT Γ2⊳αU1(o) ⊆ GT Γ2(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o)∪U2. We already proved
that for any o ∈ (U1 ∪ U2), GT Γ ′1∪Γ ′2(o) ⊆ U1 ∪ U2. The previous inclusions
imply that for any o ∈ atomO(p ⊔ p′), GT Γ ′1∪Γ ′2(o) ⊆ GT Γ (o) ∪ U1 ∪ U2.
Now if we assume by contradiction that ¬AC(Γ ′), we get that there must
exist x1, x2 ∈ XO such that x1 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x2 and x2 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x1. We make an
analysis by case:
• x1 ∈ U1∩U2. Impossible, since we have thatAC(Γ1⊳αU2) and AC(Γ2⊳α
U1), and for any o ∈ XO, x1 6⊑Γ1⊳αU2 o and x1 6⊑Γ2⊳αU1 o.
• x1, x2 ∈ U1 \U2. From induction hypothesis we get GT Γ ′1(xi) ⊆ U1 and
GT Γ ′2(xi) = ∅. This implies that for any x ∈ GT Γ ′1(xi), it holds x ∈ U1
and hence GT Γ ′2(x) = ∅. It means that x1 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x2 and x2 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x1
implies that x1 ⊑Γ ′1 x2 and x2 ⊑Γ ′1 x1 which contradicts AC(Γ
′
1).
• x1 ∈ U1\U2 and x2 6∈ U1. From induction hypothesis we get GT Γ ′1(x1) ⊆
U1 and GT Γ ′2(x1) = ∅. This implies that for any x ∈ GT Γ ′1(x1), it holds
x ∈ U1 and hence GT Γ ′2(x) = ∅. It means that x1 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x implies that
x ∈ GT Γ ′1(x1) ⊆ U1, contradiction with x2 6∈ U1 and x1 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x2.
• x1 6∈ U1∪U2 and x2 6∈ U1∪U2. In this case, by induction GT Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2(x1) ⊆
GT Γ (x1) ∪ (U1 ∪ U2) and GT Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2(x2) ⊆ GT Γ (x2) ∪ (U1 ∪ U2). Hence
x1 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x2 implies that x1 ⊑Γ x2, x2 ⊑Γ ′1⊔Γ ′2 x1 implies that x2 ⊑Γ
x1, contradiction with AC(Γ ).
• The remaining cases are symmetrical ones with the previous cases.
(While) Similar to the rule (If).
(Sub) Trivial from the premises of the rule, using the induction hypothesis, the
transitivity of ⊑r and that Γ1 ⊑r Γ2 implies that G(Γ1) = G(Γ2).
2.4 Soundness of the typing system
As already stated above, our type system aims to capture the following non-
interference condition: given a derivation p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′, the final value of a vari-
able x with final type t ⊔ α(XO), should depend at most on the initial values of
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those variables y with initial types Γ (y) ⊑ t and on the final values of variables in
XO. Or otherwise said, executing a program c on two initial states σ and ρ such
that σ(y) = ρ(y) for all y with Γ (y) ⊑ t which ends with two final states σ′ and
ρ′ such that σ′(o) = ρ′(o) for all o ∈ XO will satisfy σ′(x) = ρ′(x) for all x with
Γ ′(x) ⊑ t⊔α(XO). In order to prove the soundness of the typing system, we need
a stronger invariant denoted I(t, Γ ): intuitively, (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) means that for
each variable x and A ⊆ XO, if σ =A ρ and Γ (x) ⊑ t ⊔ α(A), then σ(x) = ρ(x).
Formally, given t ∈ L and Γ : V ar 7→ L, we define I(t, Γ )
def
=
⋂
A⊆XO
=Γ,A,α(A)⊔t .
The following lemmas provide some useful properties satisfied by the invari-
ant I(t, Γ ).
Lemma 6. If Γ1 ⊑ Γ2 then for all t ∈ L, I(t, Γ1) ⊆ I(t, Γ2).
Proof: Assume (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ1). We prove that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ2). Let A ⊆ XO
and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ2(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t. Assume that σ =A ρ. We have
to prove that σ(y) = ρ(y). We have Γ1(y) ⊑r Γ2(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and since
(σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ1) and σ =A ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Lemma 7. Let x ∈ XO, X ⊆ XO and let Γ be well-formed. Let Γ1 = Γ ⊳α x
and Γ2 = Γ ⊳α X.Then for all t ∈ L, it holds I(t, Γ ) ⊆ I(t, Γ1) and I(t, Γ ) ⊆
I(t, Γ2).
Proof: We prove only the first inclusion, the second one can be easily proved
by induction using the first one.
Let σ, ρ such that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) and let us prove that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ1).
Let B ⊆ XO and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ1(y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t. Assume that
σ =B ρ. We have to prove that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Then Γ1(y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t implies that
(
Γ (y)
)
[Γ (x)/α(x)] ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t. That is,
either Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t or Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ α(x) ⊔ t and Γ (x) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t.
– If Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t, since σ =B ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
– If Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ α(x) ⊔ t and Γ (x) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t, from σ =B ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈
I(t, Γ ), we get σ ={x} ρ, and hence σ =B∪{x} ρ. Since Γ (y) ⊑ α(B)⊔α(x)⊔t
and σ =Γ,B∪{x},α(B∪{x})⊔t ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Lemma 8. Let o ∈ XO and let Γ ′ = Γ ⊳α o with well formed AC(Γ ). Let t ∈ L
and let (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ).For any A ⊆ XO such that σ =A\{o} ρ and for any
y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t it holds that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Proof: AC(Γ ) and Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t implies that
(
Γ (y)
)
[Γ (o)/α(o)] ⊑ α(A \
{o}) ⊔ t. That is, either Γ (y) ⊑ α(A \ {o}) ⊔ t or Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and Γ (o) ⊑
α(A \ {o}) ⊔ t.
– If Γ (y) ⊑ α(A\{o})⊔t, as σ =A\{o} ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
– If Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and Γ (o) ⊑ α(A \ {o}) ⊔ t, from σ =A\{o} ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈
I(t, Γ ), we get σ ={o} ρ, and hence σ =A ρ. Since Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and
σ =Γ,A,α(A)⊔t ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
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Lemma 9. Let Γ ′ = Γ⊳αU for a well formed AC(Γ ) where U = {o1, . . . , on} ⊆
XO . Let t ∈ L and let (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ). For any A ⊆ XO such that σ =A\U ρ
and for any y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t it holds that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Proof: By induction on n. The case n = 1 follows from the lemma 8. Let us
denote Un−1 = U \ {on} = {o1, . . . , on−1}. and let Γn−1 = Γ ⊳α Un−1. Hence
Γ ′ = Γn−1 ⊳α on.
By lemma 3, Γn−1 is well formed too. AC(Γn−1) and Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A)⊔t implies
that
(
Γn−1(y)
)
[Γn−1(on)/α(on)] ⊑ α(A \ {on}) ⊔ t. That is, either Γn−1(y) ⊑
α(A \ {on}) ⊔ t or Γn−1(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and Γn−1(on) ⊑ α(A \ {on}) ⊔ t.
– If Γn−1(y) ⊑ α(A \ {on})⊔ t, since σ =(A\{on})\Un−1 ρ, by induction (taking
U ′ = {o1, . . . , on−1} and A′ = A \ {on}) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
– If Γn−1(y) ⊑ α(A)⊔t and Γn−1(on) ⊑ α(A\{on})⊔t, since σ =(A\{on})\Un−1
ρ, we get by induction (taking U ′ = Un−1 and A
′ = A\{on}) that σ ={on} ρ,
and hence σ =A\Un−1 ρ. From Γn−1(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and σ =A\Un−1 ρ using
the induction again (taking U ′ = Un−1 and A
′ = A) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
The following theorem states the soundness of our typing system.
Theorem 1. Let us assume that AC(Γ ) and ∀o ∈ XO, α(o) 6⊑ t. If p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′
then c : I(t, Γ ) =⇒ I(t, Γ ′).
Proof: Proof is by induction on the derivation of p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ
′. Let σ, σ′, ρ, ρ′
such that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) and 〈c, σ〉 =⇒ σ′ and 〈c, ρ〉 =⇒ ρ′. We prove that
(σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ ′).
Let A ⊆ XO and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t. Assume that
σ′ =A ρ
′. We have to prove that σ′(y) = ρ′(y).
We do a case analysis according to the last rule applied (case Skip is trivial).
(Ass1) c is an assignment x := e for some x 6∈ XO.
Then Γ ′ = Γ [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ [α](fv(e))]. Hence σ′ =A ρ′ implies σ =A ρ.
If y 6≡ x, then Γ (y) = Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and since σ =Γ,A,α(A)⊔t ρ, we get
σ′(y) = σ(y) = ρ(y) = ρ′(y).
Let us assume that c is y := e for some e and y 6∈ XO. Then Γ [α](fv(e)) ⊑
Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and this implies that: 1) for all variables v ∈ fv(e) \XO,
Γ (v) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, hence σ(v) = ρ(v) and 2) for all variables v ∈ fv(e) ∩XO,
α(v) ⊑ α(A)⊔ t, hence v ∈ A and σ(v) = ρ(v). We get that σ(e) = ρ(e), and
hence σ′(y) = ρ′(y).
(Ass2) c is an assignment o := e for some o ∈ XO \ fv(e).
Using Lemma 7, we get that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ1), where Γ1 = Γ ⊳α o and
Γ ′ = Γ1[o 7→ p ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e) \ o)].
If y 6≡ o, then Γ1(y) = Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and since σ =Γ1,A,α(A)⊔t ρ, we get
σ′(y) = σ(y) = ρ(y) = ρ′(y).
If y ≡ o, then p⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e) \ o) = Γ ′(o) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and this implies that:
1) for all variables v ∈ fv(e) \ XO, Γ1(v) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, hence σ(v) = ρ(v)
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and 2) for all variables v ∈ fv(e) ∩ XO, α(v) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, hence v ∈ A and
σ(v) = ρ(v). We get that σ(e) = ρ(e), and hence σ′(y) = ρ′(y).
(Ass3) c is an assignment o := e for some o ∈ XO ∩ fv(e). Similar to the previous
case, using the remark that Γ (o) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t implies that σ(o) = ρ(o).
(Seq) Trivial, using the transitivity of =⇒.
(If) Let us denote Ui = {oi1, o
i
2, . . . , o
i
n} = aff
O(ci) for i = 1, 2 for some good
orderings Ui of aff
O(ci).
• If (Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ ) ⊳α (U1 ∪ U2) 6⊑ Γ ′(y), obviously we get y 6∈ aff(c),
i.e. c contains no assignments to y. Hence σ′(y) = σ(y) and ρ(y) = ρ′(y).
Then from Lemma 7, we get that (Γ⊳α(U1∪U2))(y) ⊑r Γ ′(y) ⊑ α(A)⊔t.
Moreover, σ′ =A ρ
′ implies that σ =A\(U1∪U2) ρ and using Lemma 9 we
get σ(y) = ρ(y), and hence σ′(y) = σ(y) = ρ(y) = ρ′(y).
• Let us suppose that (Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ ) ⊳α (U1 ∪ U2) ⊑ Γ ′(y). We denote
Γ i0 = Γ ⊳α Ui. Then (Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ ) ⊳α (U1 ∪ U2) ⊑ Γ
′(y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t,
and this implies that
(Γ [α](fv(e)), Γ )⊳α (U1 ∪U2) ⊑ α(A \ (U1 ∪U2))⊔ t. Moreover, σ
′ =A ρ
′
implies that σ =A\(U1∪U2) ρ. Using Lemma 9, we get for each variable
v ∈ fv(e) that σ(v) = ρ(v). This proves that σ(e) = ρ(e) and hence both
executions 〈c, σ〉 =⇒ σ′ and 〈c, ρ〉 =⇒ ρ′ take the same branch i. Then
we use the induction hypothesis applied to p⊔ p′ ⊢α Γ{ci}Γi to get that
(σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γi), and then, since Γ ′ = Γ1 ⊳α U2 ⊔ Γ2 ⊳α U1, we use
Lemmas 6 and 7 to conclude (σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ ′).
(While) c is While e Do c1 oD . Then p ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ was inferred based on
p ⊔ pe ⊢α Γ ′{c}Γ1 and (Γ ⊳α U) ⊔ (Γ1 ⊳α U) ⊑r Γ ′ where U = affO(c) and
pe = Γ
′[α](fv(e)).
From (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ), using Lemma 7, we get (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ⊳αU) and using
now Lemma 6 and the inequality Γ ⊳α U ⊑ (Γ ⊳αU)⊔ (Γ1⊳α U) ⊑r Γ ′, we
obtain (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ′). Using the induction hypothesis applied to p ⊔ pe ⊢α
Γ ′{c}Γ1, we get that (σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ1). We apply again Lemma 7 and we get
(σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ1⊳αU), and using Lemma 6 and that (Γ⊳αU)⊔(Γ1⊳αU) ⊑r
Γ ′, we obtain (σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ ′).
(Sub) Trivial, from Lemma 6 and the induction hypothesis.
2.5 Soundness w.r.t. to output-sensitive non-interference
In this section we show how we can use the typing system in order to prove that
a program c is output-sensitive noninterferent. Let V are = V ar ∪ {o | o ∈ XO}.
Let us define L
def
= {τA | A ⊆ V are}. We denote ⊥ = τ∅ and ⊤ = τV are and we
consider the lattice (L,⊥,⊤,⊑) with τA⊔τA′
def
= τA∪A′ and τA ⊑ τA′ iff A ⊆ A′.
The following Theorem is a consequence of the Definition 1 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let L be the lattice described above. Let (Γ, α) be defined by Γ (x) =
{τx}, for all x ∈ V ar and α(o) = {τo}, for all o ∈ XO. If ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ and for all
xl ∈ XL, Γ ′(xl) ⊑ Γ (XI) ⊔ α(XO), then c is (XI , XO, XL)-secure.
16 Cristian Ene, Laurent Mounier, and Marie-Laure Potet
act ≡ r(σ(
−→
f ))
(x := e, σ)
act
−→ σ[(x, 0) 7→ σ(e)]
act ≡ w(σ(e1)) : r(σ(
−→
f ))
(x[e1] := e, σ)
act
−→ σ[(x, σ(e1)) 7→ σ(e)]
σ(e) 6= 1 act ≡ b(σ(e)) : r(σ(
−→
f ))
(While e Do c oD , σ)
act
−→ σ
σ(e) = 1 act ≡ b(σ(e)) : r(σ(
−→
f ))
(While e Do c oD , σ)
act
−→ (c;While e Do c oD , σ)
σ(e) = 1 ? i = 1 : i = 2 act ≡ b(σ(e)) : r(σ(
−→
f ))
(If e then c1 else c2 fi , σ)
act
−→ (ci, σ)
Fig. 4. Syntax and Labeled Operational semantics
Proof: Let t = Γ (XI). First, we prove that if σ =XI ρ, then (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ).
Let A ⊆ XO such that σ =A ρ and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t =
α(A)⊔Γ (XI). This implies that y ∈ XI , and since σ =XI ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Now let σ, σ′, ρ, ρ′, such 〈c, σ〉 =⇒ σ′ and 〈c, ρ〉 =⇒ ρ′ and σ =XI ρ and
σ′ =XO ρ
′. Let xl ∈ XL. We have to prove that σ′ =Xl ρ
′. Let us apply the
Theorem 1 with t = Γ (XI). Since ⊢α Γ{c}Γ ′ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I1(t, Γ ), we get that
(σ′, ρ′) ∈ I(t, Γ ′). It means that σ′ =Γ ′,XO,α(XO)⊔Γ (XI ) ρ
′. Since by hypothesis
we have that σ′ =XO ρ
′ and Γ ′(xl) ⊑ α(XO) ⊔ Γ (XI), we get that σ′ =xl ρ
′.
3 Output-sensitive constant-time
Following [1,4], we consider two types of cache-based information leaks: 1) dis-
closures that happen when secret data determine which parts of the program are
executed; 2) disclosures that arise when access to memory is indexed by sensitive
information. In order to model the latter category, we shall enrich the simple
language from section 2.2 with arrays:
c ::= x := e | x[e1] := e | skip | c1; c2 | If e then c1 else c2 fi | While e Do c oD
To simplify notations, we assume that array indexes e1 are basic expressions
(not referring to arrays) and that XO does not contain arrays. Moreover as in
[4], a state or store σ maps array variables v and indices i ∈ N to values σ(v, i).
The labeled semantics of While programs is listed in Figure 4. In all rules, we
denote
−→
f = (fi)i, where xi[fi] are the indexed variables in e. The labels on the
execution steps correspond to the information which is leaked to the environ-
ment (r() for a read access on memory, w() for a write access and b() for a
branch operation). In the rules for (If) and (While) the valuations of branch
conditions are leaked. Also, all indexes to program variables read and written at
each statement are exposed.
We give in Figure 5 the new typing rules. As above, we denote
−→
f = (fi)i,
where xi[fi] are the indexed variables in e. We add a fresh variable xl, that is
not used in programs, in order to capture the unintended leakage. Its type is
always growing up and it mirrors the information leaked by each command. In
rule (As1”) we take a conservative approach and we consider that the type of an
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x 6∈ XO
As1’
p ⊢ctα Γ{x := e}Γ [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ [α](fv(e))][xl 7→ Γ (xl) ⊔ Γ [α](fv(
−→
f )))]
x 6∈ XO
p1 = (Γ [α](fv(e1), fv(e)) pl = (Γ [α](fv(e1), fv(
−→
f ))
Ast’
p ⊢ctα Γ{x[e1] := e}Γ [x 7→ p ⊔ Γ (x) ⊔ p1][xl 7→ Γ (xl) ⊔ pl]
x ∈ XO \ fv(e) Γ1 = Γ ⊳α x
As2’
p ⊢ctα Γ{x := e}Γ1[x 7→ p ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e))][xl 7→ Γ1(xl) ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(
−→
f )))]
x ∈ XO ∩ fv(e) Γ1 = Γ ⊳α x
As3’
p ⊢ctα Γ{x := e}Γ1[x 7→ p ⊔ Γ (x) ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(e) \ x)][xl 7→ Γ1(xl) ⊔ Γ1[α](fv(
−→
f )))]
Skip
p ⊢ctα Γ{skip}Γ
p ⊢ctα Γ{c1}Γ1 p ⊢
ct
α Γ1{c2}Γ2
Seq
p ⊢ctα Γ{c1; c2}Γ2
p0 ⊑r p1 Γ ⊑r Γ
′ p1 ⊢
ct
α Γ
′{c}Γ ′1 Γ
′
1 ⊑r Γ1 AC(Γ1)
Sub
p0 ⊢
ct
α Γ{c}Γ1
pl = Γ [α](fv(e))
p′ = (pl, Γ )⊳α (aff
O(c1) ∪ aff
O(c2))
p ⊔ p′ ⊢ctα Γ [xl 7→ Γ (xl) ⊔ pl]{ci}Γi
Γ ′ = Γ1 ⊳α aff
O(c2) ⊔ Γ2 ⊳α aff
O(c1)
If
p ⊢ctα Γ{If e then c1 else c2 fi }Γ
′
pl = Γ [α](fv(e))
pe = Γ1[α](fv(e))
p ⊔ pe ⊢
ct
α Γ1[xl 7→ Γ (xl) ⊔ pe]{c}Γ
′
Γ [xl 7→ Γ (xl) ⊔ pl] ⊔ ((Γ
′[xl 7→ Γ
′(xl) ⊔ pe])⊳α aff
O(c)) ⊑r Γ1
Wh
p ⊢ctα Γ{While e Do c oD }Γ1
Fig. 5. Typing Rules for Output Sensitive Constant Time
array variable is the lub of all its cells. The information leaked by the assignment
x[e1] := e is the index e1 plus the set
−→
f = (fi)i of all indexes occurring in e.
Moreover, the new type of the array variable x mirrors the fact that now the
value of x depends also on the index e1 and on the right-hand side e.
Definition 4. An execution is a sequence of visible actions:
a1−→
a2−→ . . .
an−→.
A program c is (XI , XO)-constant time when all its executions starting with
XI-equivalent stores that lead to finally XO-equivalent stores, are identical.
Following [4], given a set X of program variables, two stores σ and ρ are X-
equivalent when σ(x, i) = ρ(x, i) for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N. Two executions
a1−→ . . .
an−→ and
b1−→ . . .
bm−→ are identical iff n = m and aj = bj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
We can reduce the (XI , XO)-constant time security of a command c to the
(XI , XO, {xl})-security (see section 2.5) of a corresponding command ω(c), ob-
tained by adding a fresh variable xl to the program variables fv(c), and then
adding recursively before each assignment and each boolean condition predicate,
a new assignment to the leakage variable xl that mirrors the leaked information.
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• ω(•)
x := e xl := xl : r(
−→
f ); x := e
x[e1] := e xl := xl : w(e1) : r(
−→
f ); x[e1] := e
skip skip
c1; c2 ω(c1);ω(c2)
If e then c1 else c2 fi xl := xl : b(e) : r(
−→
f ); If e then ω(c1) else ω(c2) fi
While e Do c oD xl := xl : b(e) : r(
−→
f );While e Do ω(c);xl := xl : b(e) : r(
−→
f ) oD
Fig. 6. Instrumentation for ω(•)
Let :,b(, )r(, )w() be some new abstract operators. The construction of the in-
strumentation ω(•) is shown in Fig. 6. As above, we denote
−→
f = (fi)i, where
xi[fi] are the indexed variables in e.
First we can extend the While language with array variables, then we need to
extend the typing system from section 2.2 with a rule corresponding to the new
rule Ast′. Then, the following lemma gives the relationship between the type
of a program c using the new typing system and the type of the instrumented
program ω(c) using the extended typing system from the previous section.
Lemma 10. Let c a command such that xl 6∈ fv(c), σ, σ
′ two stores , tr some
execution trace and [] the empty trace.
1. p ⊢ctα Γ{c}Γ
′ iff p ⊢α Γ{ω(c)}Γ
′.
2. (c, σ)
tr
−→
∗
σ′ iff (ω(c), σ[xl 7→ []]) −→∗ σ′[xl 7→ tr].
Now combining Theorem 2 and Lemma 10 we get the following Theorem which
proves the soundness of the new typing system.
Theorem 3. Let L be the lattice defined in the section 2.5. Let (Γ, α) be defined
by Γ (x) = {τx}, for all x ∈ V ar and α(o) = {τo}, for all o ∈ XO and Γ (xl) = ⊥.
If p ⊢ctα Γ{c}Γ
′ and Γ ′(xl) ⊑ Γ (XI)⊔α(XO), then c is (XI , XO)- constant time.
4 Application to low-level code
We show in this section how the type system we proposed to express output-
sensitive constant-time non-interference on the While language can be lifted to
a low-level program representation like the LLVM byte code [21].
4.1 LLVM-IR
We consider a simplified LLVM-IR representation with four instructions: assign-
ments from an expression (register or immediate value) or from a memory block
(load), writing to a memory block (store) and (un)conditional jump instructions.
We assume that the program control flow is represented by a control-flow graph
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r← op(Op,−→v ) assign to r the result of Op applied to operands −→v
r← load(v) load in r the value stored at address pointed by v
store(v1, v2) store at address pointed by v2 the value v1
cond(r, bthen, belse) branch to bthen if the value of r is true and to bfalse otherwise
goto b branch to b
Fig. 7. Syntax and informal semantics of simplified LLVM-IR
(CFG) G = (B,→E , binit, bend) where B is the set of basic blocks, →E the set
of edges connecting the basic blocks, binit ∈ B the entry point and bend ∈ B the
ending point. We denote by Reach(b, b′) the predicate indicating that node b′ is
reachable from node b, i.e., there exists a path in G from b to b′. A program is
then a (partial) map from control points (b, n) ∈ B × N to instructions where
each basic block is terminated by a jump instruction. The memory model con-
sists in a set of registers or temporary variables R and a set of memory blocksM
(including the execution stack). V al is the set of values and memory block ad-
dresses. The informal semantics of our simplified LLVM-IR is given in Figure 7,
where r ∈ R and v ∈ R ∪ V al is a register or an immediate value.
In the formal operational semantics, execution steps are labelled with leaking
data, i.e., addresses of store and load operations and branching conditions. This
formal semantics is defined in Figure 8.
p(b, n) = r ← op(Op,−→v ) v = Op (J−→v K(ρ,µ))
((b, n), ρ, µ) −→ ((b, n+ 1), ρ[r → v], µ)
p(b, n) = r ← load(v) ad = JvK(ρ,µ) val = µ(ad)
((b, n), ρ, µ)
r(ad)
−→ ((b, n+ 1), ρ[r → val], µ)
p(b, n) = goto b′
((b, n), ρ, µ) −→ ((b′, 0), ρ, µ)
p(b, n) = store(v1, v2) v = Jv1K(ρ,µ) ad = Jv2K(ρ,µ)
((b, n), ρ, µ)
w(ad)
−→ ((b, n+ 1), ρ, µ[ad→ v])
p(b, n) = cond(r, bthen, belse) JrK(ρ,µ) = 1
((b, n), ρ, µ)
j(1)
−→ ((bthen, 0), ρ, µ)
p(b, n) = cond(r, bthen, belse) JrK(ρ,µ) = 0
((b, n), ρ, µ)
j(0)
−→ ((belse, 0), ρ, µ)
Fig. 8. Labelled operational semantics for LLVM-IR
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4.2 Type system
First, we introduce the following notations for an LLVM-IR program represented
by a CFG G = (B,→E , binit), bend:
1. Function dep : B → 2B associates to each basic block its set of “depending
blocks”, i.e., b′ ∈ dep(b) iff b′ dominates b and there is no block b” between
b′ and b such that b” post-dominates b′. We recall that a node b1 dominates
(resp. post-dominates) a node b2 iff every path from the entry node binit to
b2 goes through b1 (resp. every path from b2 to the ending node bend goes
through b1).
2. Partial function br : B → R returns the “branching register”, i.e., the register
r used to compute the branching condition leading outside b (b is terminated
by an instruction cond(r, bthen, belse)). Note that in LLVM branching regis-
ters are always fresh and assigned only once before to be used.
3. Function PtsTo : (B×N)× (R∪M)→ 2M returns the set of (addresses of)
memory blocks pointed to by a given register or memory block at a given
control point. For example, bl ∈ PtsTo(b, n)(r) means that at control point
(b, n), register r may contain the address of block bl ∈M .
We now define a type system (Figures 9 to 12) that allows to express the
output-sensitive constant-time property for LLVM-IR -like programs. The main
difference with respect to the rules given at the source level (Figures 2 and 5)
is that the control-flow is explicitly given by the CFG, and not by the language
syntax. For a LLVM-like program, an environment Γ : R ∪M 7→ L, associates
security types to registers and memory blocks.
p(b, n) = r ← op(Op,−→v )
τ0 =
⊔
x∈br(dep(b))
Γ [α](x)
τ = (Γ [α](−→v ) ⊔ τ0)
r 6∈ XO
Op1
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ [r → τ ]
p(b, n) = r ← op(Op,−→v )
τ0 =
⊔
x∈br(dep(b))
Γ [α](x)
τ = (Γ [α](−→v ) ⊔ τ0)
r ∈ XO
Γ1 = (Γ, α) ⊳ r
Op2
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ1[r → τ ]
Fig. 9. assignment from an operation Op
Assignment from an operation Op (Figure 9). In rules Op0 and Op2,
the new type τ of the assigned register r is the join of the type of operands −→v
and the type of all the branching conditions dominating the current basic block
(τ0). Note that since branching registers r are assigned only once in LLVM there
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is no need to update their dependencies from output variables (using the ⊳α
operator), Γ (r) being never changed once r has been assigned.
p(b, n) = r ← load(v)
τ0 =
⊔
x∈br(dep(b))
Γ [α](x)
Am = PtsTo(b, n)(v)
τ1 = Γ [α](v) ⊔ τ0
r 6∈ XO
τ2 = Γ [α](Am)
Ld1
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ (Γ [xl → Γ (xl) ⊔ τ1][r → τ2 ⊔ τ1]
p(b, n) = r ← load(v)
τ0 =
⊔
x∈br(dep(b))
Γ1[α](x)
Am = PtsTo(b, n)(v)
τ1 = Γ1[α](v) ⊔ τ0
r ∈ XO
Γ1 = (Γ, α) ⊳ r
τ2 = Γ1[α](Am)
Ld2
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ1[xl → Γ1(xl) ⊔ τ1][r → τ2 ⊔ τ1]
Fig. 10. assignment from a load expression
Assignment from a load expression (Figure 10). Rules Ld1 and Ld2 up-
date Γ in a similar way as Op1 and Op2, the main difference being that since
some of the memory locations accessed when dereferencing v (i.e., PtsTo(b, n)(v))
are in Am (i.e., potentially in the cache) the dependencies of v are added to the
type of the leakage variable xl.
p(b, n) = store(v1, v2)
τ0 =
⊔
x∈br(dep(b))
Γ [α](x)
Am = PtsTo(b, n)(v2)
A0 = Am ∩X0
τ1 = Γ1[α](v2) ⊔ τ0
Γ1 = (Γ, α) ⊳ A0
τ2 = Γ1[α](v1)
St
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ1[xl → Γ1(xl) ⊔ τ1][vs∈Am → Γ (vs) ⊔ τ2 ⊔ τ1]
Fig. 11. store instruction
Store instruction (Figure 11). Rule St updates the dependencies of all mem-
ory locations pointed to by v2 by adding the types of v1 and v2 itself. In addition,
the type of the leakage variable xl is also updated with the dependencies of v2
and with the dependencies of all branching registers that influenced the execu-
tion flow to reach the current block b.
p(b, n) = cond(r, bthen, belse)
CJmp
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ [xl → Γ (xl) ⊔ Γ [α](r)]
p(b, n) = goto b′
Jmp
⊢α (b, n) : Γ ⇒ Γ
Fig. 12. conditional and unconditional jump
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Conditional and unconditional jump (Figure 12). Rule CJmp indicates
that the leakage variable type is augmented with the type of the branching
condition register. Unconditional jumps (Rule Jmp) leave the environment un-
changed.
4.3 Well typed LLVM programs are output-sensitive constant-time
Definition 5. An LLVM-IR program p is well typed with respect to an initial
environment Γ0 and final environment Γ
′ (written ⊢α p : Γ0 ⇒ Γ
′) , if there is
a family of well-defined environments {(Γ )(b,n) | (b, n) ∈ (B,N)}, such that for
all nodes (b, n) and all its successors (b′, n′), there exists a type environment γ
and A ⊆ XO such that ⊢α (b, n) : Γ(b,n) ⇒ γ and (γ ⊳α A) ⊑ Γ(b′,n′).
In the above definition the set A is mandatory in order to prevent dependency
cycles between variables in XO.
The following Theorem is the counterpart of Theorem 3. It shows the sound-
ness of our type system for LLVM-IR programs with respect to output-sensitive
constant-time.
Theorem 4. Let L be the lattice from the section 2.5. Let (Γ, α) be defined by
Γ (x) = {τx}, for all x ∈ R ∪M , α(o) = {τo}, for all o ∈ XO and Γ (xl) = ⊥. If
⊢α p : Γ ⇒ Γ ′ and Γ ′(xl) ⊑ Γ (XI)⊔α(XO), then p is (XI , XO)- constant time.
4.4 Example
We illustrate below the effect of the LLVM-IR typing rules on a short exam-
ple. The C code of this example is given on Figure 13, and the corresponding
(simplified) LLVM-IR on Figure 14.
int p[10], q[10] ; // global variables
int main () {
int x, y ;
p[x] = q[y] ;
return 0 ; // output value is always 0
}
Fig. 13. A C code example
First, we assume that xl denotes the leakage variable and that the con-
tent of C variables p, q, x and y are stored in memory blocks b0 to b3, i.e.
at the initial control point, PtsTo(@p) = b0, P tsT o(@q) = b1, P tsT o(%x) =
b2, P tsT o(%y) = b3.
Now we consider the following initial environment:
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@q = common global
@p = common global
%x = alloca i32
%y = alloca i32
%1 = load i32* %y
%2 = getelementptr @q, 0, %1
%3 = load %2
%4 = load %x
%5 = getelementptr @p, 0, %4
store %3, %5
Fig. 14. The simplified LLVM-IR code of Figure 13
Γ0(@p) = Γ0(@q) = Γ0(%x) = Γ0(%y) = ⊥
Γ0(b0) = P, Γ0(b1) = Q,Γ0(b2) = X,Γ0(b3) = Y, Γ0(xl) = ⊥
This initial environment captures the idea that the values of variables @p,
@q, %x, %y are addresses (of memory blocks corresponding to the “high-level”
C variables p, q, x and y) and hence their security type is ⊥, and the memory
blocks b0 to b3 correspond to the C variables p, q, x and y, and this is mirrored
in the initial environment Γ0. Moreover, initially, nothing is leaked yet.
We then update Γ0 by applying our typing rules in sequence to each instruc-
tion of the LLVM-IR representation. Note that the getelementptr instruction,
which is specific to LLVM, allows to compute an address corresponding to an
indexed access in a buffer. Hence, it is treated by our typing system as an arith-
metic (Op) instruction.
%1 = load %y
Γ1 = Γ0[xl → Γ0(xl) ⊔ Γ0(%y),%1→ Γ0(%y) ⊔ Γ0(PtsTo(%y))]
= Γ0[xl → ⊥,%1→ Y ]
%2 = getelementptr @q, 0, %1
PtsTo(%2) = b1
Γ2 = Γ1[%2→ Γ1(@q) ⊔ Γ1(0) ⊔ Γ1(%1)]
= Γ1[%2→ Y ]
%3 = load %2
Γ3 = Γ2[xl → Γ2(xl) ⊔ Γ2(%2),%3→ Γ0(%2) ⊔ Γ0(PtsTo(%2))]
= Γ2[xl → Y,%3→ Y ⊔Q]
%4 = load %x
Γ4 = Γ3[xl → Γ3(xl) ⊔ Γ3(%x),%4→ Γ3(%x) ⊔ Γ3(PtsTo(%x))]
= Γ3[%4→ X ]
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%5 = getelementptr @p, 0, %4
PtsTo(%5) = b0
Γ5 = Γ4[%5→ Γ4(@p) ⊔ Γ4(0) ⊔ Γ4(%4)]
= Γ4[%5→ X ]
store %3, %5
Γ6 = Γ5[xl → Γ5(xl) ⊔ Γ5(%5), P tsT o(%5)→ Γ5(PtsTo(%5)) ⊔ Γ5(%3) ⊔ Γ5(%5)]
= Γ5[xl → Y ⊔X, b0 → P ⊔ Y ⊔Q ⊔X ]
Making all the replacements, we get that the final environment is:
Γ6 = [xl → Y ⊔X, b0 → P ⊔ Y ⊔Q ⊔X, b1 → Q, b2 → X, b3 → Y,@p→ ⊥,@q → ⊥,
%x→ ⊥,%y → ⊥,%1→ Y,%2→ Y,%3→ Y ⊔Q,%4→ X,%5→ X ]
In this final environment Γ6, variable xl depends on the initial types X and Y
assigned to memory blocks b2 and b3. This means that the addresses accessed
when reading (resp. writing) buffer p (resp. q) may leak to an attacker. Hence,
if one of the variables x or y is a secret, since neither x nor y is an output value,
then this program is not output sensitive constant-time, which may lead to a
security issue.
4.5 Implementation
We are developing a prototype tool implementing the type system for LLVM
programs. This type system consists in computing flow-sensitive dependency
relations between program variables. Def. 5 provides the necessary conditions
under which the obtained result is sound (Theorem 4). We give some technical
indications regarding our implementation.
Output variables XO are defined as function return values and global vari-
ables; we do not currently consider arrays nor pointers in XO. Control depen-
dencies cannot be deduced from the syntactic LLVM level, we need to explic-
itly compute the dominance relation between basic blocks of the CFG (the dep
function). Def. 5 requires the construction of a set A ⊆ XO to update the
environment produced at each control locations in order to avoid circular de-
pendencies (when output variable are assigned in alternative execution paths).
To identify the set of basic blocks belonging to such alternative execution paths
leading to a given block, we use the notion of Hammock regions [15]. More pre-
cisely, we compute function Reg : (B × B × (→E)) → 2B, returning the set of
Hammock regions between a basic block b and its immediate dominator b′ with
respect to an incoming edge ei of b. Thus, Reg(b
′, b, (c, b)) is the set of blocks
belonging to CFG paths going from b′ to b without reaching edge ei = (c, b):
Reg(b′, b, (c, b)) = {bi | b′ →E b1 · · · →E bn →E b∧∀i ∈ [1, n−1]. ¬Reach(bi, c)}.
Fix-point computations are implemented using Kildall’s algorithm. To better
handle real-life examples we are currently implementing the PtsTo function, an
inter-procedural analysis, and a more precise type analysis combining both over-
and under-approximations of variable dependencies (see section 6).
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5 Related Work
Information flow. There is a large number of papers on language-based se-
curity aiming to prevent undesired information flows using type systems (see
[26]). An information-flow security type system statically ensures noninterfer-
ence, i.e. that sensitive data may not flow directly or indirectly to public chan-
nels [30,24,29,28]. The typing system presented in section 2.2 builds on ideas
from Hunt and Sands’
As attractive as it is, noninterference is too strict to be useful in practice, as
it prevents confidential data to have any influence on observable, public output:
even a simple password checker function violates noninterference. Relaxed defi-
nitions of noninterference have been defined in order to support such intentional
downward information flows [27]. Li and Zdancewic [22] proposed an expressive
mechanism called relaxed noninterference for declassification policies that sup-
ports the extensional specification of secrets and their intended declassification.
A declassification policy is a function that captures the precise information on a
confidential value that can be declassified. For the password checker example, the
following declassification policy λp.λx.h(p) == x, allows an equality comparison
with the hash of password to be declassified (and made public), but disallows
arbitrary declassifications such as revealing the password.
The problem of information-flow security has been studied also for low level
languages. Barthe and Rezk [8,9] provide a flow sensitive type system for a
sequential bytecode language. As it is the case for most analyses, implicit flows
are forbidden, and hence, modifications of parts of the environment with lower
security type than the current context are not allowed. Genaim and Spoto present
in [16] a compositional information flow analysis for full Java bytecode.
Information flow applied to detecting side-channel leakages. Information-
flow analyses track the flow of information through the program but often ignore
information flows through side channels. Side-channel attacks extract sensitive
information about a program’s state through its observable use of resources
such as time or memory. Several approaches in language-based security use se-
curity type systems to detect timing side-channels [1,18]. Agat [1] presents a type
system sensitive to timing for a small While-language which includes a trans-
formation which takes a program and transforms it into an equivalent program
without timing leaks. Molnar et al [23] introduce the program counter model,
which is equivalent to path non-interference, and give a program transformation
for making programs secure in this model.
FlowTracker [25] allows to statically detect time-based side-channels in LLVM
programs. Relying on the assumption that LLVM code is in SSA form, they com-
pute control dependencies using a sparse analysis [13] without building the whole
Program Dependency Graph. Leakage at assembly-level is also considered in [6].
They propose a fine-grained information-flow analysis for checking that assembly
programs generated by CompCert are constant-time. Moreover, they consider a
stronger adversary which controls the scheduler and the cache.
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All the above works do not consider publicly observable outputs. The work
that is closest to ours is [4], where the authors develop a formal model for
constant-time programming policies. The novelty of their approach is that it is
distinguishing not only between public and private input values, but also between
private and publicly observable output values. As they state, this distinction
poses interesting technical and theoretical challenges. Moreover, constant-time
implementations in cryptographic libraries like OpenSSL include optimizations
for which paths and addresses can depend not only on public input values, but
also on publicly observable output values. Considering only input values as non-
secret information would thus incorrectly characterize those implementations
as non-constant-time. They also develop a verification technique based on the
self-composition based approach [7]. They reduce the constant time security
of a program P to safety of a product program Q that simulates two parallel
executions of P. The tool operates at the LLVM bytecode level. The obtained
bytecode program is transformed into a product program which is verified by the
Boogie verifier [5] and its SMT tool suite. Their approach is complete only if the
public output is ignored. Otherwise, their construction relies on identifying the
branches whose conditions can only be declared benign when public outputs are
considered. For all such branches, the verifier needs to consider separate paths
for the two simulated executions, rather than a single synchronized path and in
the worst case this can deteriorate to an expensive product construction.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper we proposed a static approach to check if a program is output-
sensitive constant-time, i.e., if the leakage induced through branchings and/or
memory accesses do not overcome the information produced by (regular) observ-
able outputs. Our verification technique is based on a so-called output-sensitive
non-interference property, allowing to compute the dependencies of a leakage
variable from both the initial values of the program inputs and the final values
of its outputs. We developed a type system on a high-levelWhile language, and
we proved its soundness. Then we lifted this type system to a basic LLVM-IR
and we developed a prototype tool operating on this intermediate representation,
showing the applicability of our technique.
This work could be continued in several directions. One limitation of our
method arising in practice is that even if the two snippets xl = h; o = h and
o = h;xl = o are equivalent, only the latter can be typed by our typing sys-
tem. We are currently extending our approach by considering also an under-
approximation β(•) of the dependencies between variables and using “symbolic
dependencies” also for non-output variables. Then the safety condition from
Theorem 2 can be improved to something like ”∃V such that (Γ ′(xl) ⊳α V ) ⊑
(Γ (XI)⊳α V ) ⊔ (β′(XO)⊳α V ) ⊔ α(XO)”. In the above example, we would ob-
tain Γ ′(xl) = α(h) = β
′(o) ⊑ α(o) ⊔ β′(o), meaning that the unwanted maximal
leakage Γ ′(xl) is less than the minimal leakage β
′(o) due to the normal output.
From the implementation point of view, further developments are needed in or-
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der to extend our prototype to a complete tool able to deal with real-life case
studies. This may require to refine our notion of arrays and to take into account
arrays and pointers as output variables. We could also consider applying a sparse
analysis, as in FlowTracker [25]. It may happen that such a pure static analysis
would be too strict, rejecting too much “correct” implementations. To solve this
issue, a solution would be to combine it with the dynamic verification technique
proposed in [4]. Thus, our analysis could be used to find automatically which
branching conditions are benign in the output-sensitive sense, which could re-
duce the product construction of [4]. Finally, another interesting direction would
be to adapt our work in the context of quantitative analysis for program leakage,
like in [14].
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